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International Antitrust: From ExtraterritorialApplication to
Harmonization
JiirgenBasedow"

I. THE WORLDWIDE BOOM OF COMPETITION LAW AND ITS HARMONIZATION
One of the conspicuous features of law and legal thinking in the recent past is
the proliferation oflegislation which purports to protect competition against private
restrictions. Today, more than eighty countries are said to have some kind of
competition law, and more than two-thirds of these statutes took effect during the
past ten years.' While competition policy and antitrust law were concomitant with
highly developed economies until ten years ago, they are spread all over the world
today. Competition statutes have been enacted in Latin America,2 in the former
Soviet Block and in the Tiger States of Southeast Asia." Even in the Arab world,
competition law and policy are making some progress.5 The worldwide trend
towards competition law can, of course, easily be explained by the breakdown of
the socialist economies ten years ago. Only one of the two traditionally competing

models ofeconomic order-competition and central administration-has survived,
and the nations are now in a hurry to equip their legal systems with the standard
outfit of successful market economies.
The increase in the number of competition statutes is also favored by the
continuing liberalization of international trade, as evidenced by the Agreement
establishing the World Trade Organization of 1994 and its annexes. As trade
Copyright 2000, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
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1. Cf Robert Pitofsky, CompetitionPolicy in a GlobalEconomy-Today and Tomorrow,J.
Int'l Econ. L., 403 (1999); a similar statement can be found in Stellungnahme der Bundesregierung zum
Zw6lften Hauptgutachten der Monopolkommission 1996/1997 (1999), also published as BundestagsDrucksache 14/1274 note 96. In a comparative survey completed in 1992, only 47 jurisdictions that
have a competition statute are listed. See Ivo Schwartz & Jorgen Basedow, Restrictions on
Competition, in 111-35 Int. Encycl. Comp. L. 1, 134-39 (1995) (list of statutory material).
2. Cf Rivire Marti, La politica de competencia en America Latina,25 Revista de Direito
Econ6mico, 77, 83-84 (1997). Accordingly, eight countries (Brasil, Columbia, Costa Ricdi, Jamaica,
Mexico, Panama, Peru and Venezuela) have enacted new competition statutes since 1990. In Argentina
and Chili, older statutes already existed.
3. Cf Tibor Varady, The Emergence of CompetitionLaw in (Former)SocialistCountries,47
Am. J. Comp. L. 229 (1999).
4. As to the Republic of Korea, compareFritz Rittner, Das KoreanischeWettbewerbsgesetz als
kartellpolitischesBeispielin Festschrift for Pfeiffer 555 (Cologne 1988); for Taiwan, see Jiin Yu Wu,
Der EinfluB des Herstellers auf die Verbraucherpreise nach deutschem und taiwanesischem Recht
(Tobingen 1999).
5. For a first and hesitant approach, see the legislation ofTunisia, in particular Loi 91-64 du 29
juillet 1991 relative AIaconcurrence et aux prix, J. 0. de Ia Rdpublique Tunisienne no. 55 du 6 ao0t
1991, amended by Loi 95-42 du 24 avril 1995, J.0. de la R6publique Tunisienne no. 35 du 2 mai 1995,

p.976.
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barriers set up by states are being removed in the course of liberalization, private
companies are getting more and more exposed to foreign competition. This creates
new incentives for private action designed to restrict that competition from abroad.
A responsible policy for the opening ofnational markets must therefore go hand in
hand with the enactment of statutes against private restrictions of competition.
Otherwise, the former trade barriers put up by state law will be continued by private
agreements.
In conjunction, the convergence of national laws and the need for antitrust
statutes to supplement the liberalization ofinternational trade give new momentum
to the attempts directed at the international harmonization of competition laws.
This is clearly expressed in article 9 of the Agreement on Trade Related Investment
Measures (TRIMs) which forms part of annex A.1. of the WTO Agreement."
Under this article, the Council for Trade in Goods established by the WTO
Agreement shall review the operation ofthe TRIMs agreement and propose to the
Ministerial Conference amendments to its text if that appears appropriate. It is
explicitly provided that the Council for Trade in Goods "shall consider whether the
Agreement should be complemented with provisions on investment policy and
competition policy."
This announcement has given rise to an abundant literature and a vivid
discussion throughout the last couple ofyears.7 There are essentially three types of
objections. The first advocates a consequent extraterritorial application ofnational
laws which would reduce the need for an international harmonization considerably.'
It is at this point that the following article meets with various comments of
Professor Symeonides, to whom these lines are dedicated.9 A second type of
argument questions the theoretical soundness of harmonization and favors a
competition of competition statutes instead. ° A third type ofcriticism doubts the
feasibility of antitrust harmonization and fears perhaps the emergence of a bloated
international bureaucracy." The following discussion will elaborate on these

6. The WTO Agreement is published in 1994 O.J. (L 336); for the TRIMs Agreement in
particular, see 1994 O.J. (L 336) 100.
7. See Jtlrgen Basedow, Weltkartellrecht (Tlbingen 1998) and the references at 185.
8. See, e.g., Diane P.Wood, The Internationalization ofAntitrust-Law: Optionsfor the Future,
44 DePaul L Rev. 1289 (1995); Heinz Hauser & Rainer Schoene, Is there a Need for International
Competition Rules?, 49 Aussenwirtschaft 205, 217 (1994); cf Pierre Arhel, Droit Internationalde la
Concurrence-s'oriente-t-on vers des Ngotiations?, Revue du March6 Commun et de l'Union
Europ6enne 84, 88 (1999).
9. See, for example, his comments on theHartford case (infra note 22) in Symeon Symeonides,
Choice ofLaw in the American Courts in 1993 (and in the Six Previous Years), 42 Am. J. Comp. L.
599, 599-615 (1994).
10. Andreas Freytag & Ralf Zimmermann, Mufl die internationale Handelsordnung um eine
Wettbewerbsordnung erweitert werden?, 62 RabelsZ 38, 49 (1998); to a similar effect, see Hauser &
Schoene, supra note 8, at 216 ("[W]e should follow a decentralized approach which allows some
competition among rules.").
11. Cf Wemhard Mdschel,Internationale Wettbewerbsbeschrlnkungen in Festschift fOr Lukes
461, 462 (Cologne 1989); Joseph P. Griffin, The WTO Study ofthe Interaction between Trade and
Competition Policy: Timely and Controversial, 3 Int.Trade L. & Reg. 39,41 (1997); Wood,supranote
8, at 1297; John H. Jackson, Alternative Approaches for Implementing Competition Rules in
International Economic Relations. 49 Aussenwirtschaft 177, 196 (1994); Hauser & Schoene, supra
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objections. After a survey ofthe goals ofharmonization, Iwill outline what can be
called a pragmatic approach for future international negotiations.
II.

Is EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION SUFFICIENT?

The practical need for a harmonization of antitrust laws very much depends
upon how effectively competition in transnational markets can be protected by
national laws today. Only gaps in the protection of competition can justify the
costly and time-consuming negotiations on harmonization. Such gaps may result
from an overly lenient content ofthe substantive law, from restrictions to which its
scope ofapplication is subjected, and to difficulties in the international enforcement
at the procedural level.
In the field of substantive law, there are of course far-reaching differences
between competition laws like those of the United States of America or the
European Union which essentially build upon prohibitions that are to be applied
directly by the courts, and other jurisdictions which grant a wide discretion to
administrative authorities that may intervene against abuses if they think fit to do
so. The majority of states does not even allow for such an administrative
intervention. 12 However, the competition laws ofthe majority ofthe industrialized
nations today converge versus a western model consisting ofprohibitions ofabusive
monopolistic behavior, cartels and concerted practices, while most legislation, for
the practical implementation, provides for specific competition offenses.
Except for the problem of export cartels, deficits in the protection of
competition can hardly be ascribed to differences in substantive law. The exception
of export cartels is equally approved by all nations, but it clearly is incompatible
with the idea of an effective protection of competition in international markets: if
every nation tolerates anticompetitive behavior as long as it is directed at foreign
markets, the overall intensity ofcompetition in the world will not increase. 3 Apart
from the admission ofexport cartels, deficits in the implementation ofcompetition
law are rather the effect of rules on the application and enforcement in the
international arena.
The scope ofapplication of the law is by no means uniformly regulated. Four
types ofconflict rules can be discerned:' 4 strict territoriality, pseudo-territoriality,
the effects principle, and the balancing approach. The territorial approach was
traditionally followed by Great Britain, before that country adapted its legislation
to European Community standards in 1999. " Under the former legislation, some
note 8, at 218.
12. 'Compare the comparative survey presented by Ulrich Immenga in Immenga/Mestmacker
(eds.), EG-Wettbewerbsrecht I (Mfnchen 1997) Einleitung D no. I seq., 18 seq.; Basedow, supranote
7, at 7-10.

13.

Cf Mitsuo Matsushita, Competition Law and Policy in the Context ofthe WTO System, 44

DePaul L. Rev. 1097, 1117 (1995); Ulrich Immenga, Rechtsregeln fi r eine internationale
Wettbewerbsordnung,in Festschrift fur Mestmicker 593, 603 (Baden-Baden 1996); M6schel, supra
note 11, at 467.
14. For a thorough treatment, compare Schwartz & Basedow, supra note 1,at §36.
15. On the new British Competition Act 1998, see the contributions by Julian Maitland-Walker,
The New Competition Law Regime; Julie Nazerali & David Cowan, ImportingThe E. U.Model into UK
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territorial connection between either the acting persons or their acts and the British
territory was required for the application of the British statutes. While the
prevailing view in Britain was that only such a territorial approach could be
reconciled with public international law, the country had to accept that
anticompetitive conduct of foreign companies occurring in foreign countries,
although affecting competition on the British market, could not be controlled bythe
application ofBritish law. In the future, Britain will probably change her attitude
and advocate the more expansive conflicts rule adopted by the European Court of
Justice.
That rule amounts to an extraterritorial application of competition laws
although it relies on considerations of territoriality; we may therefore speak of
pseudo-territoriality. Thus, the European Court of Justice has held that there is a
sufficient territorial connection between an acting company established and
incorporated in a non-Member State and the European Community if a subsidiary
of that company, although having distinct legal personality, is established in the
European Community. 6 Even if that isnot the case, conduct carried out outside the
Community by a foreign corporation may still be subject to Community competition7
law ifthe restrictions of competition are to be implemented within the Community.
This approach has been characterized as an "effects principle in disguise,"'" and it
comes very close to the effects principle indeed, although some differences
remain. 9 It appears that the view of the European Court of Justice is mainly
influenced by objections pertaining to public international law. In particular, the
United Kingdom repeatedly expressed the view that the pure effects doctrine has no
basis recognized in international law.2" The far-reaching reform of the British
competition law in 1999 will perhaps stimulate a reconsideration ofthis issue in the
Community since the United Kingdom now no longer focuses on the isolated
evaluation of single anticompetitive acts as it did under the former legislation; it

Competition Law. A Blueprint For Reform Or A Step Into "Euroblivion "?;Jonathan D. C. Turner,
The UK. Competition Act 1998 and Private Rights and Shaun Goodman, The Competition Act, Section
60-The Governing Principles Clause, in 20 Eur. Compet. L. Rev. 51 (Feb. 1999).

16. Case 48/69 ICI v. Commission, [1972] E.C.R. 619 at 662.
17. Joint cases 89/65 et al. Wood Pulp, [1988] E.C.R. 5193 at 5243, considerations 16-18; on
the extraterritorial application of the EC merger control regulation, see Eleanor Fox, The Merger
Regulation and its Territorial Reach: Gencor Ltd v. Commission, 20 Eur. Compet. L. Rev. 334 (with

further references).
18. See, e.g., Michael Martinek, Das uneingestandene Auswirkungsprinzip des EuGH zur
extraterritorialen Anwendbarkeit der EG-Wettbewerbsregeln, IPRax 347, 351 (1989); to a similar
effect, see Martin Schr~dermeier, Dievermiedene Auswirkung, Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb 21 (1989).
But see, Lowe, International Law and the Effects Doctrine in the European Court ofJustice, 48 C.L.J.
9, 11 (1989); Dieter G. F. Lange &John Byron Sandage, The Wood Pulp Decision and Its Implications
for the Scope of EC Competition Law, 26 Comm. On Mkt. L.Rev. 137, 160 (1989).

19. Cf Schwartz & Basedow, supra note 1, at § 58.
20. Note no. 196 of the British Embassy at Washington, D.C., presented to the United States
Department of State on July 27, 1978, 49 Brit. YBInt. L. 390 (1978). To asimilar effect see Viscount
Dilhome in Rio Tinto Zinc Corp. v.Westinghouse Electric Corp., I All E.R. 434,460 (H.L. 1978) ("For
many years now the United States has sought to exercise jurisdiction over foreigners in respect of acts
done outside thejurisdiction ofthat country. This is not in accordance with international law....).
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will now rather depart from the restrictive effect that certain acts have on
competition in Britain.
The third type of conflict rule is the effects principle. Its rationale is rooted in
the substantive competition law which is concerned, not with the acts as such, but
with their effect on competition. Therefore, the appropriate connecting factor for
the application of a competition statute is not the territorial link of an act or of the
actor, but the effect of those acts on the competition of the home market. For the
first time, the effects principle has been adopted in the famous Alcoa case in the
United States,2' and it has recently been confirmed by the United States Supreme
Court. In HartfordFireInsurance Company v. California,the Court held it to be
"well established by now that the Sherman Act applies to foreign conduct that was
meant to produce and did in fact produce some substantial effect in the United
States;"22 such effects have to be "direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable"
in order to trigger the application of the U.S. antitrust laws.23 After the claim of
extraterritorial application had severely been criticized for many years, it can be
taken as accepted by now. Beginning with the German statute against restrictions
of competition of 195724 many competition laws enacted all over the world have
explicitly adopted the effects principle. 5 Although not all of them are applied
rigorously, they give evidence of a new state practice and of a new orientation of
public international law.
The developments of the 1990's, in particular the Supreme Court judgment in
HartfordFireInsurance,have greatly diminished the significance of the so-called
balancing approach that had been adopted by the American Restatement Third of
Foreign Relations Law. According to that restatement and some circuit court
judgments which it reflected, the claim of the American antitrust laws for
extraterritorial application should only be accepted after a balancing of the various
domestic and foreign interests, both public and private.2" In Hartford,the Supreme
Court neither accepted nor rejected the balancing approach, but it refused to follow
that approach except for cases of true conflict between an American and a foreign
statute;27 this did not leave much room for the balancing approach.
The widespread acceptance of the effects doctrine appears to guarantee an
effective protection of competition on the domestic market. Does that doctrine not
allow for the prosecution of anticompetitive behavior wherever it occurs provided
that it has some effect at home? While this is true from a theoretical point of view,
an effective implementation in practice meets two types of obstacles. In the first
place, the assessment ofone and the same anticompetitive behavior in two countries
involved may be very different although it is based on similar rules. This has been
21. U.S. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
22. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 796, 113 S. Ct. 2891, 2909 (1993).
23. Filetech S.A. v. France Telecom S.A., 157 F.3d 922, 931 (2d Cir. 1998); cf. Symeon
Symeonides, Choice ofLaw in the American Courts in 1998: Twelth AnnualSurvey. 47 Am. J.Comp.
L. 327, 359 (1999).
24. Bundesgesetzblatt I(BGB1. I)p. 1081 (Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschrtinkungen of27 July
1957), see § 98(2), which is now § 97(2).
25. See Schwartz & Basedow, supra note 1, § 60, 67.
26. Restatement (Third), of Foreign Relations Law of the United States, § 403, 415 (1987).
27. See Hartford, 509 U.S. at 798-99,113 S. Ct. at 2910-11.
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clearly shown by the merger between Boeing and McDonnell Douglas, which
practically has transformed certain segments of the world market for civil aircraft
into a duopoly. While that merger was readily approved in the United States, the
Moreover, the
European Commission imposed some severe conditions."
international enforcement ofcompetition statutes very often requires an effective
cooperation of foreign states in the service of proceedings, in the taking of
evidence, and in the enforcement of decisions. A harmonization debate would
certainly help to reduce the significance ofthese obstacles.
III.

ENFORCEMENT DEFICITS

The effective enforcement of national antitrust statutes in the international
arena invariably depends upon the assistance granted by foreign states. In many
cases this assistance is already required for the initial service of proceedings, in
others for investigations, the search ofoffices or the taking of other evidence. It is
equally impossible to enforce decisions, whether injunctions or penalties, in foreign
countries without the cooperation of the foreign state. While transnational
economic activities by necessity imply that the parties involved, relevant witnesses
and other evidence are spread over various countries, the powers of domestic
antitrust authorities and courts are limited by the territorial scope ofsovereignty as
recognized under international law. Where states cross those limits they will often
be confronted with "blocking statutes" enacted by foreign countries that want to
protect their spheres of sovereignty.29
The attempts to overcome those procedural limits can be divided into two
groups: the first deals with judicial assistance and the recognition and enforcement
of foreign judicial decisions, while the second tries to establish rules on the
cooperation of competition authorities.30 The first group embraces a number of
instruments like the Hague Evidence Convention which are applicable not only in
the area of antitrust law but in all civil and commercial matters." Since most
antitrust proceedings conducted outside the United States of America are not
judicial but administrative proceedings, the rules on the international cooperation
of cartel offices are more important in this field. These rules have made great
progress, but they are still far from perfect.
Three generations can be discerned: the first generation is that of soft law
consisting mainly of recommendations and other non-binding instruments
elaborated by international organizations. Thus, the Council of the Organization
for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) started as long ago as 1967
28. See the Decision of the Commission of30 July 1997, 1997 O.J. (L 336) 16 at considerations
no. 114-119.
29. Various blocking statutes are reproduced in A. Vaughan Lowe, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction,
An Annotated Collection of Legal Material 79 (1983); for a survey, compare P.C. F Pettit &.C. J. D.
Styles, The InternationalResponse to the ExtraterritorialApplication of UnitedStates AntitrustLaws,
37 Bus. Law. 697 (1982).
30. See Schwartz & Basedow, supra note I, §§ 92-93.
31. Hague Convention on the Taking ofEvidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters of 18

March 1970, in Hague Conference on Private International Law (ed.), Collection ofConventions 19511980 (The Hague s.d.) at 152.
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to draft recommendations for the reciprocal notification and the exchange of
information in competition proceedings with extra-territorial effects.32 The code of
conduct for restrictive business practices adopted in 1980 by the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), although mainly concerned
with substantive law, also establishes certain procedural duties for states.33 This
code requires states to institute procedures for obtaining information necessary for
the effective cQntrol of restrictive business practices and to create mechanisms for
the exchange of information and for the conveyance to other states of information
at their disposal. In addition, the code provides for a duty ofconsultation between
states that is often regarded as one of its central elements.
The second generation of procedural rules is that of bilateral treaties. Its
forerunner was the Agreement between the Government of the United States of
America and the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany relating to
mutual cooperation regarding restrictive business practices of 1976,"4 which for the
firsttime transformed the former soft law into binding rules. It was followed by
similar agreements between the United States and Australia, between the United
States and Canada and between the Federal Republic of Germany and France; the
most important of these agreements was concluded in 1991 between the United
States and the European Economic Community." By and large these agreements
all confine their attention to establishing duties ofnotification and consultation and
providing more detailed rules on obtaining information. But they do not deal with
investigations to be conducted by the competition authorities of one country in
support ofcompetition proceedings initiated in the other contracting state. Nor do
they contain any rules on the service ofproceedings abroad or on the enforcement
in one contracting state ofdecisions taken in the other contracting state. Therefore,
the instruments of the second generation still are far from being effective rules for
the extraterritorial application of competition law.
The third generation is characterized by the keyword ofthe so-called "positive
comity." While "negative comity" provisions purport to reduce the national claims
to extraterritorial application in case ofconflict ofjurisdictions, "positive comity"
provisions entitle a contracting party to ask the other contracting party to take
enforcement action against anti-competitive activity carried out on the latter's
territory but affecting competition in the former state. While the EC-US Agreement
of 1991 displayed first signs of a "positive comity" approach,36 it was only the
successive agreement of 1998 between the same parties which contains a clear-cut
rule on the matter. Article 3 of the new agreement makes it clear that the
32. Council Recommendation concerning cooperation between member countries on restrictive
business practices affecting international trade ofOctober 5, 1967. See 8 int. Leg. Mat. 1309 (1969).
33. UNCTAD Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control of
Restrictive Business Practices, U.N. Doc. TDIRBP/Conf./1O (1980), Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb

(WuW) 32 (1982).
34. Signed on June 23, 1976, TIA.S. No. 8291, (BGBI. II S. 1712).
35. Competition Laws Co-operation Agreement, Sept. 9, 1991, EEC - US, Comm. L.Eur. 1991
1383; for other bilateral agreements, see the references in Schwartz & Basedow, supra note 1,at § 91

n.530; see also the recent agreement ofJune 17, 1999, between the EC and Canada, 1999 O.J. (L175)
49.
36.

See art. V, § 2 of the Agreement, supra note 35.
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contracting party that is requested to initiate competition proceedings shall conduct
them in accordance with its own competition laws and must do so even if the
37
anticompetitive behavior does not violate the laws of the requesting state.
The latter clarification shows that "positive comity" is far from an equivalent
to the taking of evidence in support of foreign proceedings as is provided under the
Hague Evidence Convention.3" Although the evidence collected in the requested
state may also be useful for the conduct of proceedings in the requesting state, the
competition authority in the latter state is not in a position to direct the foreign
proceedings by its own questions and instructions. Moreover, the requesting party
is under a certain obligation to stay its own proceedings until the end of the
proceedings in the requested state.39 These observations show that "positive
comity" does not purport to further proceedings in the requesting state: rather, it
gives prevalence to proceedings in the requested state. This may explain why the
40
"positive comity" provisions so far have not been invoked by either side. They
do not provide help in the domestic proceedings of the requesting state, but rather
transfer the responsibility for the enforcement of competition law to a foreign
country. Although such surrender is not final and irreversible, it is difficult to
understand why a national competition authority should leave the case to the cartel
office of a foreign country whose substantive competition law may differ
considerably from its own. The harmonization of substantive law standards appears
to be a necessary precondition for the transfer of proceedings that is envisaged by
the "positive comity" provisions.
IV.

THE COMPETITION OF COMPETITION LEGISLATION

While the practical need for an approximation ofantitrust laws and procedures
should not be in dispute after the preceding considerations, some economists
question the soundness of such a harmonization for theoretical reasons. In
particular, they point out the advantages of a competition of jurisdictions or of
national legislation. They believe that, in open or integrated markets, enterprises
will articulate their preferences for a certain jurisdiction by moving their
establishment or seat toward that country. The migration of companies into the
country indicates the economic superiority of its legal system, while the mass
exodus of enterprises from a state reveals the inefficiencies of its institutions. In
their view, it is not unrealistic to assume that the latter state will adjust its legal
system to the standards set by countries which succeed in attracting foreign
companies. Alternatively, the less efficient states may keep their laws ifthey decide

37. Agreement between the European Communities and the Government of the United States
ofAmerica on the application of positive comity principles on the enforcement of their competition
laws of 4 June 1998, 1998 0. J.(L 173) 28.
38. See supra note 31.
39. See art. VI of the Agreement, supra note 37.

40. Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the application
of the Agreement between the European Communities and the Government of the United States of
America regarding the application oftheir competition laws-January 1,1998, to December 31, 1998.
COM (99) 439 final, at 3.3.
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that the policy objectives behind the laws are worth the costs incurred by the
emigration ofenterprises. Whatever the reaction ofbusiness, differences between
national legislations and the freedom oftransborder migrations are said to establish
a competition ofjurisdictions as a rational procedure for the discovery of more
efficient national laws. 4 ' From this perspective, the unification or harmonization of
laws is criticized as a kind of conspiracy oflegislators that prevents the procedure
ofdiscovery from producing its beneficent effects.42
The concept of legislative competition has originally been developed in areas
that have a direct impact on costs, such as labor law, social security and tax law, but
it has been extended to other areas, including antitrust law. 3 Some authors argue
that it is not desirable for states to agree upon international minimum standards in
competition law since this would prevent the institutional competition of antitrust
policies. This competition is said to test different policies and uncover the most
appropriate one."
The comparison of the unification of laws with a conspiracy of legislators
appears, however, to be ill-founded.4' This does not mean that the concept of
legislative competition cannot help to explain the behavior of companies and/or
legislators. But its practical significance lies in areas which are characterized by a
territorial application of laws, i.e., in areas where legal provisions are applied to
acts committed in the legislating state or to persons established there. From the
principle of territorial application of a certain statute flows the consequence that
economic actors can avoid that statute by moving to a foreign country. While this
condition essentially is fulfilled with regard to matters such as tax law and labor
law, the starting point is entirely different in the case of antitrust. Whether
competition laws are enforced on the basis of the effects principle, the balancing
approach or some pseudo-territorial application, the migration of a company from
one country to another does not change anything as long as the anticompetitive
behavior produces effects on the market of the legislating state. The enforcement
claim ofthat state's legislation remains equally immune to all attempts to avoid this
legislation by committing the anticompetitive acts abroad.
Therefore, one of the basic conditions for the successful functioning of
legislative competition is absent in the area of antitrust law. Although the
abstention from harmonization in this field will keep alive a certain competition of
ideas that are tested in different national statutes, it can by no means be compared
to the competition of legislation as explained in economic theory.
Moreover, a competition of antitrust laws would appear highly questionable.
If the assumptions of economic theory are correct, private business would opt for
41. See Friedrich von Hayek, DerWettbewerb als Entdeckungsverfahren.Vortrag,gehalten am
5. 7.1968 am InstitutflirWeltwirtschafl ander UniversititKiel,in von Hayek, Freiburger Studien 249
(Tabingen 1969).
42. Manfred Streit, Systemwettbewerb im europtlischen Integrationsprozefl, in Festschrift ftr
Mestncker 521 (Baden-Baden 1996); Juergen Donges, Wieviel Deregulierung brauchen wirfarden

EG-Binnenmarkt?, 36 Beihefte der Konjukturpolitik. Zeitschrift orangewandte Wirtschaftsforschung
169 (1990).
43. See supra note 10.

44.

Freytag & Zimmermann, supra note 10, at 49.

45.

See Basedow, supra note 7. at 55.
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the country in which it finds the legal framework most favorable to its own interests.
In the area of antitrust laws this would be a state that permits anticompetitive
agreements and practices to the greatest extent possible. The most appropriate
competition policy to be "discovered" in that process would allow hard-core cartels
and even monopolization. If the idea of legislative competition is taken seriously
in this area, we would sacrifice competition on the markets for goods and services
in favor of legislative competition.
In sum, the co-existence of different antitrust statutes all over the world has the
advantage of providing the continuous stimulus to reconsider the pros and cons of
a national competition statute. However, this advantage would not be sacrificed by
a harmonization of minimum standards at the international level. Such a minimum
harmonization, which is the only realistic option at present, would preserve the
laboratory ofcomparative law and would leave many options fornational legislators
above the level ofthe minimum standard.
V.

THE FEASIBILITY OF HARMONIZATION

Many opponents to the harmonization project refer to far-reaching differences
between national competition policies which practically frustrate all international
negotiations in this field.' At first sight, this objection appears to contradict the
common observation that there is a "remarkable convergence in national
competition policies., 47 Isn't it true that compulsory cartels, which were so widespread before the second world war, are disappearing all over the world? Is the
avalanche of antitrust statutes enacted in so many countries not evidence of a
growing and spontaneous approximation of competition policies? While these
observations are true, it cannot be denied that to date less than fifty percent of the
4
200 independent states have enacted a statute against restrictions of competition,

and even among those states, competition policies are far from being in conformity
with each other. They differ in the evaluation of vertical restraints, merger control,

the impact ofnon-competitive public interest, in the sanctions to be inflicted and in
the procedures to be followed. It should not be forgotten that antitrust statutes can
be shaped and applied in a way that comes close to a direct regulation ofindustry,

and that is what occurs in some countries.
Nevertheless, the existing differences do not appear to preclude the
harmonization of competition laws and the coordination of national competition
procedures. They rather call for a cautious and pragmatic approach. It should not
fix the ideal target of a uniform world competition law, but rather describe the

general setting of the harmonization process. As a consequence, the following
limitations should be observed:

46. See, e.g., Moschel, supra note 11, at 462; Griffin, supra note 1i, at 41; Wood, supra note
8, at 1297; Jackson, supra note 11, at 196; Hauser & Schoene, supra note 8,at 218.
Bus. Law. 485 (Nov.
47. F. M. Scherer, Competition Policy Convergence: Where Next?. 24 Int.

1996).
48.

See supra note 1.
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(1) Negotiations should only be conducted with those states that already
have proven their interest in competition law by enacting a national
statute. Other states should be admitted as observers, but should not
be allowed to slow down negotiations by motions rooted in an
anticompetitive national policy. Ifthey want to participate with equal
rights in the negotiations they can easily adopt one of the existing
national laws, the EC law, or one ofthe international codes ofconduct
as a model for a national statute.
(2) At a first stage, the subject of negotiations should be confined to areas
in which a convergence of national solutions can already be
ascertained. This regards the so-called hard core cartels, vertical
price fixing and the prohibition of abuses of dominant positions.49
Although the world-wide concentration process makes it desirable to
include merger control into the negotiations, it is doubtful whether the
fundamental differences in this area can be overcome. It is wellknown that the reservation of public interest in merger control
proceedings is often used as a loop-hole for an industrial policy aimed
at the creation of huge corporations which can survive in world-wide
competition. Such policies have influenced merger control in many
countries, even in the United States. As long as those policies are
pursued, it is difficult to see how an effective merger control can be
attained at the international level. Similar considerations, apply to
restrictions ofcompetition inspired or supported by states, such as the
business conduct of public enterprises and state aids.
(3) A third limitation concerns the scope of harmonization. It should be
confined to cases with an international dimension, i.e., where
transboundary trade is affected." Harmonization and unification
efforts in other areas of the law such as the sale of goods"1 or
transportation" have proven successful because they did not endeavor
to achieve a unification across the board but only insofar as
transboundary transactions are involved. Thus, states retain the right
to adopt different rules with regard to purely domestic transactions,
which substantially lowers the opposition towards international
unification. As those examples show, international conventions, even

49. These subjects are also mentioned in European Commission, Competition Policy in the New
Trade Order: Strengthening International Competition and Rules-Report of the Group ofExperts 22,
Sub 3.2 (Luxemburg 1995); on the resale price maintenance see Reflection paper of UlrichImmenga,
id. at 35 sub 111;
to a similar effect, see Matsushita, supra note 13, at 1113; Immenga, supra note 13,
at 602.
50. To a similar effect, see Draft International Antitrust Code, infra note 62, Art. 3; Immenga,
supra note 13, at 601.
51. United NationsConventionon Contractsforthe InternationalSale ofGoods Done at Vienna
on April 10, 1981, 19 Int. Leg. Mat. 668 (1983).
52. Convention for the Unification ofCertain Rules Relating to the International Carriage by-Air
Done at Warsaw on October 12, 1929,137 L.N.T.S. 11 (1929) asamended by The Hague Protocol Done
on September 28, 1955, 478 U.N.T.S. 371.
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iflimited in the aforementioned way, will have an impact on domestic
legislation in the long run anyway.
(4) Finally, negotiations should aim at an agreement on minimum
standards. The world-wide debate on an international harmonization
of competition laws gives rise to a certain fear in countries such as the
United States which dispose of very effective means to enforce
competition law that they will be bound to cut back on that
enforcement, and in particular, to give up the extraterritorial
application of their antitrust laws. Apparently the idea of a minimum
harmonization is neither discussed nor very well-known in the United
States. In the European Union this concept has been implemented in
a great number of directives, in particular in the field of consumer
protection.53 Community measures like the "Council directive on
unfair terms inconsumer contracts" often contain clauses under which
"[m]ember States may adopt or retain the most stringent provisions
compatible with the Treaty in the area covered by this Directive, to
54
A
insure a maximum degree of protection for the consumer."
certain
guarantee
would
law
similar approach in competition
minimum standards such as the prohibition ofvertical restraints under
the rule of reason without depriving the contracting states ofthe right
to subject those restraints to per se prohibitions.
After all, differences in national competition legislation may be an effective
obstacle to an outright unification, but they cannot be said to prevent the
international community from embarking upon negotiations on a minimum
harmonization of certain rules for restrictions of competition which have an
international dimension.
VI. THE GOALS OF HARMONIZATION
The international harmonization of competition laws appears desirable for
various reasons. Among the foremost objectives is the need to cure deficits in the
enforcement of national competition laws. This need has already been explained.
It requires an extension of the scope of national competition laws to export cartels
and other restrictions which are primarily designed to affect foreign markets. In
other words, we need a different conflicts rule for the application of competition
statutes. The effect that anticompetitive behavior can have on the domestic market
cannot be the sole decisive factor for the application of national competition law.
The existence of alternative links such as the place of conduct or the nationality or
establishment of the actors should be sufficient. This is a delicate and crucial
question since the contracting states would need to accept that protection of
competition is in the universal interest of the international community and not only
53. See Mindestharmonisierung im Binnenmarkt (Ulrich Everling & Wulf-Henning Roth eds.,
Baden-Baden 1997).
54. See Art. 8, Council Directive 93/13/EEC of April 5, 1993 on unfair terms in consumer

contracts, 1993 O.J. (L 95) 29.
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in the public interest of the particular state. At the same time, the contracting states
would need to agree that a restriction of competition on foreign markets cannot be
justified by their national foreign trade interests.
In the second place, there are manifold interrelations between international
trade policy and competition law. As pointed out above, the liberalization of trade
in goods and services is not welcome with all competitors in the markets, and some
may wish to perpetuate the former trade barriers by means of private agreements.
A consistent policy must foresee such consequences and conceive appropriate
remedies in competition law. A similar interaction can be observed in the field of
intellectual property rights. By their very nature, the holders of such rights are
entitled to monopolistic behavior and may wish to engage in monopolistic abuses.
Since the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPs)" puts the contracting states under a duty to respect intellectual property
rights, it also had to envisage the possibility of such abuses. While articles 8(2) and
40 of TRIPs give evidence of a corresponding consciousness, they equally show
that the contracting states could not agree upon appropriate countermeasures in
competition law.
A further interaction between trade and competition policies relates to
dumping. As a form ofpredatory pricing, dumping depends upon the possibility of
a company to cross-subsidize certain goods or services by extra profits made on the
home market where it disposes of a dominant position. An effective and
extraterritorial control ofsuch abusive conduct under the competition laws of either
the exporting or the importing country would therefore allow the importing state to
repeal its anti-dumping laws. This has indeed happened in the framework of a
bilateral agreement between Australia and New Zealand. 6
Negotiations on the international harmonization ofcompetition law would need
to pursue other objectives as well. States would certainly embark upon the
harmonization track in order to avoid conflicts ofjurisdiction that have impaired
international life so often in the past. Where former efforts have always focused on
jurisdictional and conflict oflaws issues, a solution might also be achieved by the
harmonization of substantive competition laws. Only on the basis of such a
harmonization would it be possible to concentrate the administrative competence
and to implement the one-stop-shop principle, which is a major concern ofprivate
business in international competition law. An international harmonization project
would finally serve as a model for future competition legislation at the national
level. It would be particularly valuable for countries which have refrained from
developing a competition policy of their own so far. A model approved by an
international conference could give them guidance which they would probably
accept more willingly than the adoption of a foreign competition law.

55.

Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 1994 O.J. (L 336) 213.

56. Cf Protocol of August 18, 1988 to the Australia New Zealand Closer Economic
Relations-Trade Agreement on Acceleration of Free Trade in Goods, 1988 Austl. T. S.No. 18, see art.
4; cf also Basedow, supra note 7, at 43.
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A PRAGMATIC APPROACH

Which are the recommendations for political action which follow from the
preceding considerations? At the outset I must repeat that the harmonization of
competition laws amounts to a taming ofeconomic nationalism since states must no
longer be allowed to tolerate, for the sake of domestic profits, anticompetitive
conduct aimed at foreign markets. This is the most crucial point, and explains the
difficulty of harmonization. The target cannot be expected to be achieved in one
go, but only step by step. This is very different from other unification projects
which may be negotiated for a number ofyears, but then are brought to an end at
one single diplomatic conference. In antitrust law, states are well advised to embark
upon the road towards harmonization with less ambition. What can be attained in
the near future is the beginning of an open-ended negotiation process. At a first
stage, this process may lead to a first agreement on some basic issues, which then
will have to be tested in economic practice before the negotiations can be resumed
and turn to further issues some years later. A successful model for that process
could be the development of international trade law in the framework of the
GATT 7 and its successor, the World Trade Organisation (WTO).5 ' The close link
between international trade and competition law would in fact suggest that the
periodical WTO negotiation rounds should be used for the promotion of
competition law harmonization.
The method ofharmonization should be equally cautious. This does not mean
that the international community should resume the former efforts to adopt soft law

in this area; 59 those efforts have not produced any perceptible effects. While
international negotiations should aim at the drafting of binding provisions of law,
they should respect national legislations and refrain from far-reaching interventions.
As pointed out before, they should be limited to restrictions ofcompetition with an
international dimension and should aim at an agreement on minimum standards.
This would imply the adoption of a non-self-executing treaty. The technique of
self-executing conventions, which is used for example in the UN Sales Convention 6
and in the Warsaw Convention on air transport,6 ' is difficult to reconcile with the
intention ofstates to enact provisions at the national level which provide for a better
protection of competition, but are applicable to the same fact situations. The
resulting blend of international conventions and national provisions would be too
confusing. A non-self-executing treaty would allow a contracting state to maintain,
in its internal legislation, a single body of competition rules which implement the
treaty and set higher standards at the same time.
As to the substance ofcompetition law, the negotiations should be confined to
types ofanticompetitive conduct that are regarded as harmful to the economy by all
57. On the step-by-step liberalization ofinternational trade inthe framework of GATr, see ErnstUlrich Petersmann, InternationalGovernmental Trade Organizations-GAIT and UNCTAD, Int.
Encycl. Comp. L. vol. XVI ch. 25 1981 §§ 5, 23-25.
58. See supra note 6.
59. See supra text accompanying notes 32 and 33.
60. See supra note 51.
61. See supra note 52.
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or the vast majority of states. This would include the prohibition of hard core
cartels, i.e., agreements on horizontal price fixing, quota and other market shares,
the concertation of offers in public bidding, etc. In the area of vertical restrictions
it would equally include a perse prohibition of vertical price fixing. With regard
to other vertical restraints and to abuses ofdominant positions it should be possible
to reach an agreement on a prohibition under the rule of reason. As pointed out
before, a similar consensus on the substantive criteria of merger control is less
likely, but it would appear highly desirable and feasible to harmonize the essential
rules on merger control procedures: the duty to notify certain mergers to the
national competition authority, the time-limits to be respected before the merger is
put into effect, the kind of information to be supplied to the competition authority,
etc. An international convention should also establish the obligation of the

contracting states to set up national competition authorities for the enforcement of
the substantive rules, and to provide for private law remedies such as damages or
the invalidity of contracts concluded in violation of the substantive competition
rules.
The enforcement of the harmonized laws should remain in the hands ofnational

agencies.

In order to increase the effectiveness of national enforcement

proceedings, the states should conclude amultilateral convention establishing some
basic procedural duties of notification, information and consultation. An additional

cooperation of national authorities with regard to the service of proceedings, the
taking of evidence and even the enforcement of foreign decisions would be highly
desirable, but the multilateral negotiations would be overburdened with those
topics; they may be negotiated in additional conventions, probably on a bilateral
basis.
While the creation of an international competition authority with its own
enforcement jurisdiction would not appear to be a realistic option for the time
being, the international community would profit from an international agency which
serves as a platform for the exchange of information and the discussion of world
competition. It would have to register violations of the international competition
law and publish periodical assessments ofinternational competition in the different
sectors of the economy. It might also be entrusted with the powers to conduct
investigations and even with the right to bring suit in national courts, either against
private companies for their anticompetitive conduct or against the respective state
for tolerating violations of the international competition convention. The latter
62
solution has been proposed in the Draft International Antitrust Code which has
been elaborated by an international expert group some years ago. It is an original
and inventive idea which may help to lead the debate on an international antitrust
agency out of the dead end. This proposal might indeed put some pressure on states
which do not comply with the international competition convention without
encroaching upon the sovereignty ofthose countries.

62. The Draft International Antitrust Code is published in Antitrust & Trade Regulation Report
(BNA) 64 (1993), Special Supplement no. 1628 of August 19,1993; see also Basedow, supra note 7,
at 70, 142; and Wolfgang Fikentscher & Andreas Heinemann, Der "'DraftInternational Antitrust
Code"--Initiativef~r ein Weltkartellrechtim Rahmen des GA 7T,WuW 97 (1994).
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The measures outlined above are not meant to form part of a whole which
could only be approved as such. Many of them could be adopted individually, but
their overall effect on competition would certainly increase if the whole package
could be agreed upon.

